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Paul Krugman 
There is no generally accepted formal definition of a currency crisis, but 
we  know them when we  see them. The key element is a sort of circular 
logic, in which investors flee a currency because they fear that it might be 
devalued, and in which much (though not necessarily all) of the pressure 
for such a devaluation comes precisely from that capital flight. Such crises 
have been a recurrent feature of the international economy ever since gold 
and silver coins were replaced by paper; currency crises played a large role 
in  the economic turmoil of  the interwar era, in the breakup of  Bretton 
Woods, and in the early stages of the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s. And since the late 1970s currency crises have also been  a major 
subject of academic study. 
But nothing in the past history of the subject prepared economists for 
the 1990s. Future historians may, in fact, dub this the Age of  Currency 
Crises: never before, not even in the interwar period, have currency crises 
played such a central role in world affairs. The massive attacks that roiled 
the European Monetary System in 1992-93  were a high-water mark for 
currency speculation; but that mark was soon surpassed by the “tequila” 
crisis of  1995; and that mark surpassed by  the still-unfolding Asian cur- 
rency crisis of 1997-98,  which at the time of writing seems to be spreading 
back to Latin America. Currency crises-both  crises that actually do hap- 
pen and the sometimes desperate efforts of national governments and in- 
ternational agencies to head them off before they start-have  become a 
defining force for economic policy in much of the world. 
Paul Krugman is professor of economics at Princeton University and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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It might seem that the decision to hold a special conference on currency 
crises at the National Bureau of Economic Research was  a natural  re- 
sponse to this vastly heightened importance of the subject. In fact, how- 
ever, this is  only partly true. Martin Feldstein approached me with the 
idea for such a conference in  1996, when the European and Latin crises 
had subsided and the idea that something even worse could happen to 
emerging Asia never even entered people’s minds. By the time of the con- 
ference in February  1998, of course, what had been conceived as a low- 
key academic research meeting had acquired enormous salience. 
Aside from topicality, however, why  was another conference on a well- 
established research field needed? The answer is that despite two decades 
of research on the causes and consequences of currency crises, important 
issues are either unresolved or require a fresh look in the face of new ex- 
perience. Here is a review of the three main issues that the conference re- 
visited. 
What Drives Crises? 
Despite the fact that everyone agrees in a broad sense about the nature 
of currency crises-about  the circular logic in which expectations of de- 
valuation make devaluation more likely-the  details have long been dis- 
puted. In general, this dispute divides researchers along two fault lines. 
First, through what channel does speculation against a currency make 
the devaluation of that currency more likely? In the early currency crisis 
models, the channel was assumed to be essentially a mechanical linkage: 
speculation led to a depletion of foreign exchange reserves, which would 
then force the central bank to give up its defense of the original parity. 
One can still defend this assumption as a useful first pass at the problem- 
and in some cases even a reasonably good description of events. However, 
from the early years of  currency crisis research many economists have 
argued that in the real world governments have much more freedom of 
action than the stylized models recognized, and that as a result the logic of 
such crises was more subtle and less mechanical than the existing theory. 
Until  recently the  most influential alternative to the classic foreign- 
reserve-driven crisis model  was what  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 
(1996) have dubbed “second generation” crisis models, which emphasize 
not the mechanical exhaustion of foreign exchange but the problems of 
macroeconomic policy. Loosely, a second-generation model imagines a 
government that is physically able to defend a fixed exchange rate indefi- 
nitely, say, by raising interest rates, but that may decide the cost of defense 
is  greater than the cost in terms of  credibility or political fallout from 
abandoning the defense and letting the currency float. In this case a cur- 
rency crisis can develop because doubts about the government’s willing- 
ness to defend the parity force it to raise interest rates, and the need to Introduction  3 
keep interest rates high in turn raises the cost of defending the parity to a 
level  the government finds unacceptable. The second-generation model 
came into its own in the European crises of  1992-93  and remains an im- 
portant piece of the research agenda. In chapter 1 Barry Eichengreen and 
Olivier Jeanne argue that a version of second-generation theory does well 
at explaining not only recent European experience but  also one of the 
important currency crises of the interwar period: Britain’s departure from 
the gold standard in 1931. Allan Drazen’s analysis of contagion, in chapter 
2, is also predicated on second-generation logic, in which abandonment 
of the fixed parity brings macroeconomic gains but political costs, costs 
that are less if other countries have also faltered. 
However, the emerging market crises of 1995 and 1997 do not seem to 
fit either first- or second-generation logic. After all, according to second- 
generation models devaluing or floating a currency gives the government 
freedom to follow more expansionary policies; yet in both Latin America 
and Asia  currency crises were followed by  severe recessions. Most  re- 
searchers have therefore concluded that a different type of model-third 
generation?-is  needed, with most work focusing on the issues involving 
financial intermediaries and liquidity effects. Guillermo Calvo’s chapter 
3 offers a rich menu  of possible third-generation crisis models; Steven 
Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs offer an insightful comparison of the “real econ- 
omy” implications of alternative crisis stories in chapter 4 and argue for 
what may be becoming the canonical story about emerging market crises, 
the idea that such crises are essentially bank runs that manifest themselves 
through the foreign exchange market. 
While the mechanism of crisis has been one source of dispute, the deter- 
minants of whether and when a crisis occurs has been another. Early crisis 
models were “fundamentalist”: that is, crises happened to countries whose 
fixed exchange rates were  unsustainable in  the long run, and happened 
when underlying economic conditions-such  as the level of  foreign ex- 
change reserves-deteriorated  past some critical point. However, an alter- 
native tradition-particularly  associated with Maurice Obstfeld (1994), 
who unfortunately could not  attend the conference-argues  that crises 
involve a strong element of self-fulfilling  prophecy, that exchange regimes 
that could have survived indefinitely can nonetheless collapse if subjected 
to an essentially random speculative attack. Radelet and Sachs argue this 
position strongly for emerging Asia: drawing on both economic evidence 
and the apparent lack of early warning signs from the financial markets, 
their view is  that this was  a gratuitous crisis, that nothing in  the Asian 
situation warranted such a sudden reversal of fortune. 
It may be worth Eoting that in the months following the conference, two 
broad strands of  “third generation” modeling did emerge. One strand- 
building on an idea largely due to Ronald McKinnon (see in particular 
McKinnon and Pill 1996) but applied to the Asian crisis by a number of 4  Paul Krugman 
authors-focused  on the role of implicit loan guarantees  in  generating 
excessive risky investment. Currency crises are then interpreted as a crisis 
of this moral hazard regime; it is the collapse of the investment that precip- 
itates the macroeconomic setback. 
The other strand elaborates on the “bank run” story suggested by Rade- 
let and Sachs, emphasizing self-fulfilling collapse via either literal bank 
runs-a  view  promulgated  by  Chang and Velasco  (1998a,  1998b)-or 
some kind of balance-sheet-driven financial contraction. 
While there are dissenters, it seems fair to say that academic opinion 
has swung fairly strongly toward the self-fulfilling crisis view, largely be- 
cause of the phenomenon  of  “contagion”: the way  that a crisis in  one 
country seems able to trigger a crisis in another, even when the economic 
links appear to be minor. Most economists have concluded that this can 
happen only if believing makes it so-that  is, if  the nervousness created 
by  a crisis in one country can set in motion a self-fulfilling run on the 
currency of another. However, the Drazen chapter points out that since in 
many crisis models the cost of abandoning a peg is essentially political- 
presumably because of the loss of credibility when a government reneges 
on a pledge to maintain the exchange rate-the  lack of strong economic 
linkages may be irrelevant. If governments find safety in numbers, if deval- 
uing when  other countries have already devalued is  less costly to one’s 
reputation  than acting alone, contagion can be consistent with a funda- 
mentalist story about the timing of crises. 
Clearly these controversies have not been resolved; but clearly also there 
has been a deepening of our understanding of the issues, and considerable 
movement in the views of the main protagonists. 
How Should We Model Governments? 
One of the main issues in currency crisis modeling-closely  tied to the 
distinction between first-, second-, and third-generation models-is  the 
question of how to think about government behavior. The early models 
assumed a very passive government, which stolidly doled out foreign ex- 
change until the last dollar was gone; later models have tended to assume 
a much more sophisticated, activist policy. It also turns out that analyzing 
crises requires that one specify not only what the government will do dur- 
ing the crisis but what policies it will follow if its defense of the exchange 
rate fails. 
Most of the papers in the volume give at least some consideration to 
these issues. Two focus specifically on government policies. In chapter 5 
Robert Flood and Peter Garber take on a currency regime that was at the 
time of writing still prospective-the  “Stage 111” regime in  Europe, in 
which the euro exists as a unit of account but not yet as an actual circulat- 
ing currency. It is widely assumed that the financial arrangements within Introduction  5 
Stage I11 will ensure the invulnerability of that system to speculative at- 
tack. Flood and Garber point out, however, that at least in principle those 
arrangements imply a willingness of national central banks to extend each 
other completely open-ended credit lines; if one has doubts about whether 
they will actually do so, one also has doubts about whether the system is 
really crisis-proof. One need not agree that a Stage I11 crisis is at all likely 
to agree that this kind of careful attention to the implications of monetary 
arrangements can be crucial. 
Sebastian Edwards and Miguel Savastano consider the policies followed 
by  the Bank of Mexico after the  1994 crisis-a  period during which the 
peso suffered a megadevaluation, far greater than most analysts had ex- 
pected, and in which interest rates rose to unexpected heights. In chapter 
6 Edwards and Savastano show that the textbook assumption that a cen- 
tral bank pegs until its reserves are gone, then lets the currency float freely, 
is far from the reality: in actuality the peso was the subject of considerable 
attempts at short-term management even in the postcrisis float. 
What Are the Effects of Crisis? 
If there has been one area in which views of currency crises have shifted 
most  since the origins of  the academic literature two decades ago, it is 
probably the consequences of such crises for the real economy. In the early 
models crises were thought of as monetary events with few  real conse- 
quences. Second-generation  models, which  emphasized  the  macroeco- 
nomic payoff to devaluation, suggested that real economic performance 
should if anything improve following a successful speculative attack-and 
the folk wisdom has been that this was in fact the case in Europe following 
the 1992 crisis. More recently, the experience of emerging economies has 
suggested to many that currency crises, by forcing these countries to move 
suddenly from current account deficit to surplus, cause severe economic 
downturns. 
On closer examination, however, these generalizations are far less clear. 
Robert Gordon revisits the postcrisis European landscape in chapter 7 
and finds that the conventional view that it was better to fail than to suc- 
ceed at currency defense is heavily colored by just one comparison-Brit- 
ain versus France-and  that the overall picture is much less clear. (And 
the subsequent rise of the pound suggests that structural factors may have 
played a bigger role, and monetary ones a smaller one, in British success 
than widely believed.) Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin focus 
on emerging economies in chapter 8, examining a cross section of many 
crisis episodes. Their surprise conclusion is that currency crises and sud- 
den current account reversals are not the same thing-and  that while cur- 
rency crashes are normally associated with sharp declines in output, cur- 
rent account reversals are not. At the very least this suggests that we  need 6  Paul Krugman 
to rethink the channels through which the adverse effect of currency crises 
takes place. 
A Field in Transition 
The study of currency crises is a field in flux, largely because the world 
itself keeps on throwing up new crises for us to examine at a rate that 
would be gratifying to scholars if it were not so terrifying to policymakers. 
The papers collected in this volume are very far from the last word. But 
they represent the latest thinking, captured at a moment in which some of 
the best minds in economics were focused on the theory and practice of 
speculative attack, and will surely serve as the basis for much more work 
to come. 
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